by: Nick Davis
In Nolan’s article on “Descartes’ Ontological Argument,” the author provides an excellent breakdown of Descartes’ so-called proof for the existence of God. He diagnoses Descartes’ argument by breaking it down into three separate parts; the first part being the simplicity of Descartes’ argument, the second the distinction between essence and existence, and the third providing various objections and replies between skeptics and Descartes himself. This paper seeks to illustrate a fair account of Nolan’s deduction of Descartes argument as well as establish its own grounds for the validity of Descartes’ ontological argument.
First, let us begin this deduction by defining what ontological is. Ontological (or a priori) is to be defined as knowledge that can be known without any empirical evidence. Now, as for the subject of ontological arguments, Descartes’ is not the only one to formulate one. An earlier version of this type of argument existed with St. Anselm in the eleventh century and had long since died out; however, Descartes’ denies any ties to this traditional argument (p. 1). Descartes’ ontological argument holds that the existence of the concept of God entails the existence of God, and according to Descartes, to conceptualize something posits that this certain something must exist. Thus, most simply stated, because there is a clear and distinct idea or concept of a supremely perfect being (namely, God), God must exist. Descartes also suggests that his argument is not a formal proof at all but is a self-evident axiom obtained intuitively by a mind exempt from philosophical prejudice (p. 1)
In the first part, Nolan claims that Descartes’ version of the ontological argument is simplistic in that it compares the way we ordinarily establish basic truths while using arithmetic and geometry (p. 2). This holds that God’s existence can be fundamentally known through human intuition. We are capable of attaining knowledge of God’s existence by learning that the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being is found in apprehending necessary existence, just as Nolan writes “if I am able to clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence pertains to the idea of a supremely perfect being, then such a being truly exists (p. 3).” However, the premise for necessary existence to be conceptually linked to God’s existence does not depend ontologically on anything, for He is omnipotent and exists by His own power, and if God did not exist on His own initiative then it would be impossible for God to be omnipotent (p. 4). On page 5, Nolan states that Descartes further develops his previous analogy between the ontological argument and arithmetic. In this section Descartes suggests that there is one group of “meditators for whom God’s existence is immediately manifest” through his demonstration of a triangle whereas the latter group of “meditators…require a proof to attain the requisite clear and distinct perception” through looking at the Pythagorean Theorem to see God as self-evident (or as having necessary existence contained in the idea of supremely perfect being) (p. 5). Nolan points out on page 6 that Thomas Aquinas rejected the claim that God’s existence is self-evident because what is self-evident cannot be denied without contradiction, but God’s existence can be denied. Quite frankly I would have to agree with Aquinas on this point as existence can be denied; however, merely denying that something exists doesn’t mean that that something doesn’t exist. Take a car on an empty tank of gasoline for example. Merely thinking or believing with your ability or willpower to deny that your car is not out of gasoline wont get you any closer to your destination. Denying the reality of having no more gas won’t put more gas into your tank, nor will it mean that gasoline doesn’t exist. Denial does not evoke non-existence; it only posits an opinion based upon your perspective. In Descartes’ defense, Nolan points out that he does not hold that God’s existence is immediately self-evident or self-evident to everyone, but only that it can become self-evident with meditatiors that free themselves of all philosophical prejudices (p. 6).
In the second part, Nolan shows Descartes traditional medieval perspective on the distinction between essence and existence. On this notion, it is held that Descartes believed in a version of the Theory of Rational Distinction, which articulates that “a mind is merely rationally distinct from its thinking and a body is merely rationally distinct from its extension” (p. 8) and that in the abstract essence and existence are distinctly different, but in reality they are completely identical (p. 9). From Descartes viewpoint, “God is merely rationally distinct from his necessary existence, while every finite created thing is merely rationally distinct from its possible or contingent existence” (p. 9). By holding God and created beings on these two separate grade levels, this perspective allows Descartes to account for the theological difference that God independently exists of Himself and that His creation is entirely dependent on Him for existence (p. 9). God is distinguishable because of His higher level of existence and independent being. The result of this principle leads to the belief that ontological arguments cannot be conjured up for created substances or beings but only for God (p. 10). A finite thing cannot have an ontological argument produced for it because a finite thing is dependent on God, whereas the whole idea of a supremely perfect being containing necessary existence rests upon an ontologically independent argument (p. 10).
In the third part, Nolan draws out two necessary and sufficient conditions for Descartes’ version to be held prestigiously superior to his predecessors. The first condition is the theory of innate ideas and the latter the doctrine of clear and distinct perception. These two conditions protect Descartes’ ontological argument from the charges that were made against Anselm as well as provide the tools for answering any other objections. These conditions safeguard Descartes’ argument from suffering the objection of fictional ideas by purporting that the idea of God is something innate to the human intellect (p. 10). Among the other objections, there is “the claim that even if we were to concede that necessary existence is inseparable from the idea of God, nothing follows from this about what does or does not exist in the actual world” (p. 11) of which Descartes’ responds with the principle of clear and distinct perception, which bridges the gap between mere thoughts and reality (p. 11). Another objection which is much more difficult to respond to is Immanuel Kant’s objection which states “Whenever we think of anything, we regard it as existing, even if the thing in question does not actually exist. Thus, existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing (p. 13).” This very same objection was later refined by Bertrand Russell, claiming that “the statement “God exists” is not ascribing existence to a subject, but asserting that a certain description (in single quotes) applies to something in reality (p. 13).” Nolan goes about responding to this fine objection by first, prior to mentioning how Descartes might defend himself, noting that the “question at issue is typically framed in non-Cartesian terms and thus often misses its target (p. 14),” or more plainly stated, the question (or objection) is irrelevant to Descartes’ intended framework because his argument was never meant to be picked apart by logical issues when the argument itself was constructed on subject-predicate logic inherited from Aristotle (p. 14). If Descartes were to answer the question, nonetheless, he would have defended it by conceding to certain aspects of the objection such as the point that existence does not add anything to the mere idea of something and the notion that a thing cannot have properties unless it exists (p. 14). Conceding to these aspects asserts that the distinction between a substance and its existence is limited explicitly to thought or reason, therefore rendering a substance as its existence in reality (p. 15). Nolan concludes his deduction of Descartes’ ontological argument not by demanding the verdict for the case as true but to show that Descartes had a sophisticated and systematic way of treating existence (p. 15).
Work Cited
Nolan, Lawrence. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. 15 October 2006. Stanford University. 13 October 2008
